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How to Make a 29% Increase Look Bigger:




Quantitative information can appear in different units (e.g., 7-year warranty p 84-
month warranty). This article demonstrates that attribute differences appear larger
on scales with a higher number of units; expressing quality information on such
an expanded scale makes consumers switch to a higher-quality option. Testifying
to its practical importance, expressing the energy content of snacks in kilojoules
rather than kilocalories increases the choice of a healthy snack. The unit effect
occurs because consumers focus on the number rather than the type of units in
which information is expressed (numerosity effect). Therefore, reminding consum-
ers of alternative units in which information can be expressed eliminates the unit
effect. Finally, the unit effect moderates relative thinking: consumers are more
sensitive to relative attribute differences when the attribute is expressed on ex-
panded scales. The relation with anchoring and implications for temporal dis-
counting and loyalty programs are discussed.
A s a consumer, would your preference for a dishwasherdepend on whether its warranty level is expressed in
months rather than years? Would you be more likely to
choose an option that indicates its superior quality in units
of 1,000 rather than 10? We argue herein that you would,
in both cases. That is, consumers tend to perceive the same
attribute differences as larger on scales that have many units
than on scales with fewer units, such that the difference
between ratings of 7 and 9 on a 0–10 scale appear smaller
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than the difference between 700 and 900 on a 0–1,000 scale.
This scale-dependent perception of attribute differences may
induce increased preferences for the product with the su-
perior score.
While previous research indicates that a change in the
unit in which quantitative information is provided affects
consumer preferences (Burson, Larrick, and Lynch 2009),
the exact mechanism has not been demonstrated before. This
article shows that the same attribute differences appear
larger on scales with many units (expanded scales) than on
scales with fewer units (contracted scales). In addition, this
research demonstrates that this unit effect results from the
fact that consumers tend to ignore the unit in which infor-
mation is provided and focus on the sheer number instead.
In particular, we show that reminding consumers that the
same information could have been specified in an alternative
unit eliminates the unit effect. We also extend prior research
by demonstrating the unit effect for a consequential choice.
Finally, this article integrates the unit effect with work on
relative thinking (e.g., Saini and Thota 2010) as we show
that a change in scale may affect the influence of relative
attribute differences. This implies that relative and absolute
attribute differences interact to affect consumer evaluations.
Quantitative information is common in various situations,
including product features and evaluations, service satis-
faction, scholastic achievements, and job applicant apti-
tudes. This article demonstrates that the choice of unit to
describe quantitative information may have profound con-
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sequences for consumers’ perceptions, preferences, and
choices. The unit effect that we document is relevant for
any setting in which quantitative information appears or is
sought by consumers or decision makers. That is, whenever
people engage in quantitative comparisons of options, the
number of units used to express the difference may alter
preferences and decisions.
THE UNIT EFFECT
Quantitative information can usually be specified in alter-
native units. A distance can be specified in miles and in
kilometers. Temperature can be specified in Fahrenheit and
in Celsius. Prices can be specified in different currencies.
When consumers are confronted with quantitative infor-
mation specified in an unfamiliar unit, they may try to trans-
late it to a familiar unit. For instance, while in the United
States, to figure out the weather forecast, European con-
sumers try to translate temperatures specified in Fahrenheit
to temperatures in the familiar Celsius scale. United States
consumers engage in the opposite calculation when vaca-
tioning in Europe. This translation is carried out to be able
to evaluate the numbers one is confronted with. Often this
translation is rather difficult, and consumers guesstimate
rather than exactly calculate the corresponding score in a
familiar unit.
The inexact translation to a familiar unit may render con-
sumers susceptible to anchoring effects. For instance, con-
sumers often spend less in a foreign country if the value of
one unit of the foreign currency is lower than the value of
one unit of their own currency, compared with the opposite
scenario (face-value effect; Raghubir and Srivastava 2002).
When budgets and income also get transformed into the
foreign currency, though, the opposite phenomenon—a re-
verse face-value effect—occurs (Wertenbroch, Soman, and
Chattopadhyay 2007). Thus, prices seem higher in Mexico
than in Great Britain (e.g., a US$20 blouse costs about
Mex$247 but about £13), a face-value effect, whereas the
residual budget after spending seems larger in Mexican pe-
sos than in British pounds, a reverse face-value effect.
While consumers may spontaneously translate informa-
tion specified in an unfamiliar unit to a familiar unit, in a
host of circumstances consumers may not engage in any
form of translation. This is particularly the case when no
preferential target for translation exists. So, while the pref-
erential target of translation exists for a foreign currency,
namely, the domestic currency, for many types of attribute
information, no preferential target of translation may exist.
For instance, a score of 1,000 can be translated into a score
on a 100-, 10-, or 50-point scale, but there is no particular
reason to do so. Translating the attribute information from
one unit to another unit usually does not make the attribute
information (or the difference between two attribute levels)
easier to evaluate. Correspondingly, consumers may not feel
the need to translate the attribute information to a different
unit. In fact, even though the choice of unit may be rather
arbitrary, the notion that the attribute information could have
been specified in an alternative unit probably does not even
enter consumers’ minds.
In the absence of routine translation to a different unit to
evaluate the difference between two attribute levels, con-
sumers may just focus on the number of scale units used to
express a certain difference and ignore the type of unit in
which quantitative information is provided (cf. numerosity
heuristic; Pelham, Sumarta, and Myaskovsky 1994). When
focusing on the sheer number of a difference, all quantities
become dimensionless. As a result, higher numbers then
represent bigger quantities. Ignoring the unit in which in-
formation is specified may lead consumers, for instance, to
appreciate a 24-month warranty difference more than a 2-
year warranty difference or to think that a 200-point dif-
ference on a 1,000-point scale represents a bigger difference
than a 2-point difference on a 10-point scale. Clearly, when
the unit in which information is provided affects perceived
differences between alternative options (unit effect), this
should also lead to changed preferences and choices.
Several studies are consistent with the hypothesized unit
effect. For instance, shortly after the introduction of the euro,
French consumers perceived the price gap between the more
expensive national brands and the cheaper private labels as
smaller when prices were expressed in euros versus in
French francs, resulting in an increased transaction value
for the national brands (Gaston-Breton 2006). Considering
that the euro is a contracted price scale compared to the
French franc scale (i1 p FF 6.56), this finding seems con-
sistent with the proposed unit effect. However, it is not clear
whether this so-called accordion effect exemplifies a unit
effect or results from anchoring. Immediately after the
change of French francs to euros, French consumers may
have tried to make sense of prices in euros by translating
them to French francs. As this involves a rather difficult
translation, French consumers may have estimated rather
than calculated the prices, and anchoring may have ensued.
More direct evidence for the unit effect was provided by
Burson et al. (2009), who demonstrated that changing the
scale in which attribute information is provided may indeed
affect consumer preferences. For instance, in Burson et al.’s
first study, participants chose between two plans that allowed
them to rent a certain number of movies within a given time
period; the authors found that participants preferred the
cheaper plan when the number of movies available for rent
appeared on a per week basis (contracted scale). However,
they chose the more expensive option when the available
movies were presented per year (an expanded scale). While
Burson et al. do not provide a test of the underlying mech-
anism, they also claim that switching from a contracted scale
to an expanded scale may increase perceived attribute dif-
ferences and, as a result, may increase the ease with which
consumers can discriminate between alternatives and the
relative weight attached to the various attributes.
Our article extends this earlier work in several respects.
First, it directly shows that expanded scales lead to inflated
perceptions of attribute differences. Second, we provide evi-
dence that these altered perceptions lead to changes in pref-
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erences and affect real behavior. This lends additional cre-
dence to the idea that the unit effect may be a rather general
phenomenon. Third, this article contributes to our under-
standing of numerosity effects by delineating the unit effect
from related phenomena, in particular the (reverse) face-
value effect. More specifically, we propose that different
processes drive these two phenomena. The (reverse) face-
value effect results from difficult translations of prices and
budgets, which demand that consumers estimate, rather than
calculate, the domestic prices and budgets. Large denomi-
nation prices and budgets likely prompt overestimations,
whereas small denominations may lead to underestimations.
In contrast, the unit effect is not due to deficient translation;
most people know that a 200-unit difference on a 1,000-
unit scale is equivalent to a 2-unit difference on a 10-unit
scale. However, consumers do not engage in any translation
at all, as they fail to consider that information on a 1,000-
unit scale could have been expressed on an alternative scale.
It is this failure that leads to the neglect of the unit in which
the information is provided. Accordingly, reminding con-
sumers that the same information could have been specified
in an alternative unit eliminates the unit effect. Fourth, while
various studies indicate that consumers are sensitive to at-
tribute ratios (e.g., Hsee et al. 2009; Kwong and Wong
2006), this article shows that this sensitivity is moderated
by the number of units used to describe the attribute.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
In study 1, participants receive information regarding two
options that differ on a single attribute. The information
regarding this attribute is expressed either on a contracted
scale or on an expanded scale. Study 1 demonstrates the
basic unit effect: consumers perceive an objective attribute
difference as bigger when the number of units expressing
the difference is greater. In study 2, participants receive price
and quality information for three brands, such that the lower-
quality information would appear more attractive. It shows
that multiplying the quality ratings by 100 reduces the at-
tractiveness of the lower-quality option. In addition, medi-
ation analysis indicates that this shift toward the higher-
quality option is due to an increase in perceived quality
differences. As studies 1 and 2 use hypothetical situations,
study 3 tests whether the unit in which information is spec-
ified affects real choices as well. Participants receive energy
content information in an expanded or a contracted scale
and are given a choice between an apple and a Twix bar.
The choice of the apple increases when the energy infor-
mation is specified on an expanded scale, albeit only for
participants with no prior interest in food energy informa-
tion.
Study 4 focuses on the underlying cause of the observed
unit effect and tests whether reminding consumers of alter-
native units in which information can be expressed reduces
the unit effect. Participants are asked to indicate their will-
ingness to pay (WTP) for expedited delivery for products
purchased online, expressed either in days or in months.
When the alternative unit (months or days) is not made
salient, a higher WTP is observed when expedited delivery
is specified in days rather than in months. However, re-
minding participants of the alternative unit eliminates this
effect entirely. Finally, as several lines of research suggest
that consumers often pay attention to relative differences
between options, study 5 tests how a change in unit may
affect this sensitivity to relative differences. It demonstrates
that, consistent with the observed unit effect, relative dif-
ferences gain in impact when expressed on an expanded
scale.
STUDY 1: THE UNIT EFFECT
When consumers compare attribute levels, they may not be
sure about how to conceive of a given attribute difference
(Hsee 1996; Yeung and Soman 2005) and therefore may
resort to the numerosity heuristic (Pelham et al. 1994). This
heuristic emerges when consumers estimate the total quan-
tity of a set of elements from the number of elements in
that set but do not take the type of elements sufficiently into
account (Pelham et al. 1994). When consumers evaluate the
difference between two attribute levels, they may pay more
attention to the number of units rather than the type of units.
As a result, we hypothesize
H1: Consumers perceive an objective attribute differ-
ence as bigger when the number of units express-
ing the difference is greater (unit effect).
To test hypothesis 1, participants received information about
a single attribute for two options, either on a scale with few
units (contracted scale) or on a scale with many units (ex-
panded scale). Participants then indicated the size of the
difference between the two options.
To test the generality of the presumed unit effect, we use
three stimulus variations. First, we varied the focal attributes
among probability of success of a medical treatment, tele-
vision quality ratings, and dishwasher warranty levels. Sec-
ond, we varied the scales that presented the attribute infor-
mation, using either a 0–10 scale or a 0–1,000 scale for the
probability of success of a medical treatment and television
quality ratings, as well as years versus months for the dish-
washer warranty levels. Third, we either left the objective
difference the same for both scales (dishwasher) or made it
slightly smaller in the scale that contains more units (medical
treatment success, television quality).
Method
In return for partial course credit, 210 students (129 men,
81 women) from various majors at Ghent University par-
ticipated in the study (mean age p 20.28 years; SD p
1.97). The participants were told that they would have to
compare two television sets on the basis of an overall quality
score, two surgical procedures on the basis of the probability
of success, or two dishwashers on the basis of their warranty.
In the latter situation, the two warranties lasted for 7 versus
9 years or 84 versus 108 months. In the other two situations,
the attribute scores for the two options were 7 versus 9 (on
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TABLE 1
PERCEIVED DIFFERENCES AS A FUNCTION OF SCALE FOR THREE CONDITIONS: STUDY 1
Condition/scale Attribute scores Perceived difference t p h2
Dishwasher warranty:
Years 7 vs. 9 3.60 (SD p 1.20) t(84) p 2.80 !.01 .085
Months 84 vs. 108 4.28 (SD p 1.03)
Television quality:
10 unit 7 vs. 9 4.26 (SD p .82) t(60) p 1.77 .08 .049
1,000 unit 704 vs. 903 4.61 (SD p .76)
Medical success probability:
10 unit 7 vs. 9 4.90 (SD p .98) t(60) p 2.09 .04 .068
1,000 unit 704 vs. 903 5.32 (SD p .54)
the 10-point scale) and 704 versus 903 (on the 1,000-point
scale). After viewing the two options, participants indicated
how large they considered the difference to be between the
two options, on a 6-point scale without a neutral option (6
p very large; 1 p very small).
Results and Discussion
We conducted separate t-tests for each of the three situ-
ations to determine whether the perceived differences are
larger when the attribute information involves many units
than when it features fewer units. In two of the three situ-
ations, we found significantly larger perceived differences
when the information is expressed through many units. In
the remaining situation (TV), the results were similar albeit
only marginally significant. Still, the observed unit effect
did not significantly differ across the three situations (F(2,
204) p 0.61, p p .54; see table 1).
The first experiment confirms hypothesis 1. For all sit-
uations, the perceived difference between two options in-
creases as the scale presenting the information includes more
units. In the medical success and television quality scenarios,
the objective difference actually is smaller in the 1,000-unit
condition (199/1,000) than in the 10-unit condition (2/10).
In addition, in the 1,000-unit condition, the difference occurs
slightly higher on the scale than in the 10-unit condition.
Because of diminishing sensitivity (Kahneman and Tversky
1979), this second finding also implies that the perceived
difference should be slightly smaller in the 1,000-unit con-
dition than in the 10-unit condition if no unit effect were
present. Thus, these two scenarios actually represent some-
what conservative tests of hypothesis 1, as their slightly
lower effect sizes, compared with the dishwasher scenario,
support.
STUDY 2: FROM UNIT EFFECT TO
PREFERENCE REVERSAL
The aim of study 2 is threefold. First, we want to test whether
a change in the unit in which attribute information is pro-
vided leads to changed consumer preferences. Although
Burson et al. (2009) have already demonstrated that this
may be the case, we aim to replicate it using a different
methodology. This would testify to the robustness of such
an effect. Second, and more important, we aim to investigate
the process involved in the change in preferences. In par-
ticular, we want to investigate whether the effect of the
number scale units on perceived attribute differences (cf.
study 1) mediates the presumed effect on consumer pref-
erences. Third, we want to examine whether the scale-de-
pendent perception of attribute differences is due to the as-
sociation of big numbers with big quantities or results from
the more general process of magnitude priming (Oppen-
heimer, LeBoeuf, and Brewer 2008).
To achieve these aims, we draw on the attraction effect
(Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982) to create a situation in which
consumers find a lower-quality option attractive. That is, the
participants in study 2 receive information about the price
and quality of three home cinema systems. The attraction
option (B) dominates a decoy option (C) because it offers
the same quality but at a lower price, which also should
make it more attractive than the target option (A) that offers
a higher quality but at a higher price. However, when we
display the quality ratings in many units, the perceived qual-
ity differences should increase, such that participants may
be willing to pay more for the higher-quality option (target
option). So, we propose:
H2: The effect of the number of attribute units on the
probability of choosing the superior option is me-
diated by an increased perceived quality differ-
ence.
Note that we do not investigate the effect of the number of
units on the attraction effect itself. That would require con-
ditions without the decoy option. We merely draw on the
attraction effect as a tool to show that changes in the number
of units in the quality ratings may lead to changes in pref-
erences.
We divide this investigation into two parts. In study 2A,
we record participants’ choices, whereas in study 2B, we
additionally ask participants to indicate their perceptions of
quality and price differences. Including these two judgment
tasks serves two functions. First, we can test whether the
effect of the number of units on choice is mediated by its
effect on perceived quality differences. Second, this addition
enables us to consider an alternative account based on mag-
nitude priming (Oppenheimer et al. 2008). When quality
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TABLE 2
PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING ATTRACTION, DECOY, AND TARGET OPTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF SCALE UNITS:
STUDY 2
Study 2A (N p 73) Study 2B (N p 96)
10 (n p 36; %) 1,000 (n p 37; %) LR x2(1) p 10 (n p 50; %) 1,000 (n p 46; %) LR x2(1) p
Target option 19 46 5.95 .02 14 43 10.59 .001
Decoy option 6 0 2.89 .09 4 9 .91 .34
Attraction option 75 54 3.53 .06 82 48 12.73 !.001
NOTE.—LR p likelihood ratio.
FIGURE 1
PRICE AND QUALITY JUDGMENTS AS A FUNCTION OF
THE NUMBER OF UNITS: STUDY 2
information gets expressed as many units, respondents may
imagine greater quantity, which could then distort any sub-
sequent judgment. In particular, a magnitude-priming ex-
planation for our findings would suggest that the number of
units used to express quality information should increase
perceived differences for not only the quality dimension but
also the price dimension. Yet, if the unit effect occurs be-
cause consumers do not routinely translate information to a
different scale, then the unit effect should be restricted to
the quality dimension and not occur for the price dimension.
So, we expect:
H3: Changing the scale of quality ratings affects per-
ceived quality differences but not perceived price
differences.
Method
For the combined study, 169 students (70 men, 99
women) from various majors at Ghent University partici-
pated and received partial course credit (mean age p 19.53
years; SD p 1.66). Participants considered price and quality
information about three fictitious home cinema systems on
manipulated scales for the quality information. Half of the
participants considered a score on a 1,000-point scale, whereas
the other half saw expressions on a 10-point scale. The decoy
option indicates identical quality as the attraction option but
a higher price (quality: 7/10 or 700/1,000; price: decoy p
i275, attraction p i250), and the target option is higher
on both (quality: 7.5/10 or 750/1,000; price: i300). In study
2A, participants merely indicated the brand they would
choose; in study 2B, they also evaluated the quality and
price differences between the attraction option and the target
option on a 6-point scale (1 p very large; 6 p very small).
We reversed these scores before analysis.
Results
Brand Choice (Both Studies). The scale significantly af-
fects the chosen brand in both study 2A (likelihood x2(2, N
p 73) p 8.10, p p .018) and study 2B (likelihood x2(2,
N p 96) p 12.86, p p .002). The probability of choosing
the target option increases significantly in the 1,000-unit-
scale condition, whereas the probability of choosing the at-
traction option decreases, although only marginally signif-
icantly in study 2A (see table 2). Although participants
choose the attraction option more often than the target option
in the 10-unit-scale condition, which implies an attraction
effect, they do not in the 1,000-unit-scale condition.
Rating Scales (Study 2B). We use a 2 (number of units
for quality: 10 vs. 1,000) # 2 (dimension: quality vs. price)
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor for
perceived quality and price differences. A main effect in-
dicates that price differences (M p 3.66) seem greater than
quality differences overall (M p 2.80; F(1, 94) p 35.25,
p ! .001). Another main effect reveals higher judgments in
the 10-unit condition (M p 3.05) than in the 1,000-unit
condition (M p 3.42; F(1, 94) p 7.75, p ! .01). The main
effects are qualified by a dimension # number of units
interaction (F(1, 94) p 13.06, p ! .001; see fig. 1). We find
a unit effect for perceived quality difference (M10 p 2.38
vs. M1,000 p 3.26; t(94) p 4.54, p ! .001), although not for
perceived price difference (M10 p 3.72 vs. M1,000 p 3.59;
t(94) p .68, NS).
Mediation Analysis (Study 2B). Following the procedure
described by MacKinnon (2008) for testing mediation in
categorical data (i.e., brand choice), we find that the ob-
served unit effect on target option choice is fully mediated
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by the unit effect on perceived quality differences (Sobel
test: z p 3.048, p p .002).
Discussion
Study 2 indicates that the number of attribute scale units
may affect consumer preferences. That is, increasing the
number of units used to provide the attribute information
shifts consumers’ preferences to the option that is superior
on that attribute. In addition, the unit effect on consumer
preferences is entirely the result of a unit effect on perceived
attribute differences (hypothesis 2). Finally, in support of
hypothesis 3, changing the unit in which quality was ex-
pressed affected perceived quality differences but did not
alter perceived price differences. This is expected as price
information was neither expanded nor contracted. This pat-
tern of results is inconsistent with an alternative account that
relies on magnitude priming (Oppenheimer et al. 2008).
STUDY 3: NUDGING HEALTHY CHOICES
The previous demonstrations of the unit effect all involve
choices and decisions that entail no real consequences for
the participants. Study 1 focused on perceptions; study 2
involved hypothetical choices. The aim of study 3 is to
demonstrate that a change in unit may also affect real
choices. In the current study, participants were offered the
choice of a snack: an apple or a Twix. We provided all
participants with energy content regarding the two options,
either in kilocalories or in kilojoules. As 1 kilocalorie equals
4.184 kilojoules, the differences in energy content should
be perceived as bigger when the energy information is ex-
pressed in terms of kilojoules than in terms of kilocalories.
As a result, we hypothesize.
H4: The choice of the apple (lower energy content
than Twix) should be higher in the kilojoules con-
dition than in the kilocalories condition.
In this study, we also explore whether habitual interest in
energy information moderates the unit effect. We expect the
unit effect to have a larger effect on consumers who have
demonstrated no prior interest in energy information. As
energy information is often provided both in kilojoules and
in kilocalories, consumers who typically pay attention to
this information may, at least implicitly, have learned the
existence of the alternative unit and thus may be less likely
to neglect the unit type.
Method
In exchange for course credit, 56 undergraduates of Til-
burg University participated in a 1-hour session of unrelated
experiments. At the end of the session, participants had to
sign up at the experimenter’s desk to complete registration.
As a way of thanking the students for their participation,
they were offered the choice between an apple and a Twix
bar, which were presented in baskets on the experimenter’s
desk. The baskets were provided with energy labels in ki-
lojoules (247 for apple vs. 1,029 for Twix) or kilocalories
(59 for apple vs. 246 for Twix). The experimenter (blind to
the hypothesis) switched the labels in between participants
as much as possible. So participants were randomly assigned
to the kilojoules or the kilocalories condition according to
the order in which they left their cubicle and approached
the experimenter.
To justify the use of energy labels, we told participants
that policy makers are raising voices to put energy counts
on menus and to increase the visibility of energy labels on
food products. Because of this ongoing debate, we as “con-
sumer scientists” decided to better communicate the energy
content of the products offered in the lab. After this brief
introduction, the participants could make their choice. Ad-
ditionally, we asked for their habitual use of energy counts:
“to what extent do you usually look at the energy content
of products” and “to what extent do you consider energy
content when choosing food or drinks” on a 7-point rating
scale anchored by “never” to “always.” We aggregated these
two self-report measures into an overall “prior interest in
energy information” index (Cronbach’s a p .78).
Results
A binary logistical regression of the snack choice was
conducted, with energy label (kilojoules vs. kilocalories),
prior interest in energy information—treated as an interval
level variable—and the interaction between energy label and
prior interest in energy information as the independent var-
iables. As hypothesized, participants were more likely to
chose the apple in the kilojoules condition compared to the
kilocalories condition (Wald x2(1) p 4.69, p p .03). Over-
all, the probability of choosing the apple in the kilocalories
condition was 18%, compared to 41% in the kilojoules con-
dition. This main effect, however, was qualified by a sig-
nificant interaction between energy label and prior interest
in energy information (Wald x2(1) p 4.56, p p .033). Fig-
ure 2 shows the estimated probabilities of choosing the apple
in both scale conditions, for participants who scored 1 SD
below the mean and for participants who scored 1 SD above
the mean of prior interest in energy information (M p 3.46;
SD p 1.53). For participants with a low prior interest in
energy information, the estimated probability of choosing
an apple significantly increased from about 3% to 59%
(Wald x2(1) p 4.36, p p .037). For participants with a high
prior interest in energy information, the estimated proba-
bility of choosing an apple did not significantly change (58%
vs. 42%; Wald x2(1) p 0.63, p p .43).
Discussion
While the previous studies involved perceptions or hy-
pothetical choices or both, the current study demonstrated
that changes in scale can affect real choices. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of the unit
effect in real life. Specifically, the current study shows that
providing food energy information in kilojoules rather than
314 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 2
ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING AN APPLE
OVER A TWIX BAR AS A FUNCTION OF ENERGY LABEL
AND PRIOR INTEREST IN ENERGY INFORMATION: STUDY
3
in kilocalories makes participants more likely to choose an
apple over a Twix bar.
In addition to showing the unit effect in a real choice,
the current study also revealed a boundary condition. While
the unit effect was observed for participants who typically
do not pay attention to energy information, it was not ob-
served for participants who typically do. Assuming that con-
sumers who typically pay attention to energy information
know of the existence of both the kilocalorie and the ki-
lojoule specification and the relation between them, this fail-
ure to obtain a unit effect for knowledgeable participants
may already suggest that the unit effect occurs only if people
tend to neglect the unit in which information is provided.
However, consumers who habitually pay attention to caloric
information may also be more likely to have some approx-
imate idea of the caloric content of an apple and a common
candy bar. As such, their behavior may be less affected by
the caloric information offered at the time of choice. Study
4 will therefore provide a more direct test that reminders of
alternative units eliminate the unit effect.
STUDY 4: ELIMINATING THE UNIT
EFFECT
The obtained unit effect on the perceived attribute differ-
ences seems most consistent with the idea that consumers
pay attention to the numerical quantities but do not (or in-
sufficiently) take into account the unit in which the quan-
titative information is offered. Consumers likely do not
spontaneously translate numbers on one scale to numbers
on another scale, so they may not realize that a seemingly
big difference would not appear as big on an alternative
scale. In fact, consumers may even fail to realize that the
information could have been offered in entirely different
units. Possibly, when consumers are made aware of the fact
that quantities may be specified as different numbers on
different scales, the unit effect can be reduced or even elim-
inated. So, we propose:
H5: The unit effect is reduced when consumers con-
sider that quantitative information could have
been expressed in another unit.
In addition, we hope to replicate the unit effect in a situation
that is radically different from the previous ones. More spe-
cifically, in study 4, participants have to decide whether they
would pay more for an earlier delivery of a product they
bought. The earlier delivery is specified as either 1 month
or 31 days. The unit effect implies that consumers should
be more likely to pay more for expedited delivery (ceteris
paribus) when they can gain 31 days than when they can
gain “just” 1 month. However, this effect should be elimi-
nated if consumers are reminded of the fact that expedited
delivery specified in days could have been specified in
months and vice versa.
Method
One hundred and seventy-eight students (88 men, 90
women) with various majors at Ghent University partici-
pated in exchange for partial course credit (mean age p
21.26 years; SD p 0.65). The study was a 2 (temporal
frame: 1 month vs. 31 days) # 2 (salience of an alternative
temporal frame: not salient vs. salient) between-subjects de-
sign. All participants were confronted with 12 situations in
which they had to decide whether they would like to upgrade
for an expedited delivery at the cost of a higher price. The
12 situations result from a 2 (product: CD vs. cell phone)
# 2 (initial delivery date: in 3 months vs. in 12 months)
# 3 (price increase for expedited delivery: 5% vs. 10% vs.
15%) design, in which all variables were manipulated within
participants. Expedited delivery always referred to receiving
the item 1 month earlier. The use of 12 situations helps to
assess the robustness of the hypothesized effects.
To manipulate the temporal frame, for half of the partic-
ipants, the temporal information was specified in months
(i.e., initial delivery in 3/12 months and decided whether to
pay more for earlier delivery by 1 month) or in days (i.e.,
initial delivery in 91/365 days and decided whether to pay
more for earlier delivery by 31 days). To manipulate the
salience of an alternative temporal frame, before the delivery
choice task, all participants engaged in a subjective time
estimation task. Using a slider, they indicated for 12 time
periods whether it involved a very short period or a very
long period. For half of the participants, all time periods
referred to the unit they would be exposed to later (i.e.,
either all in months or all in days). For the other half, six
of the time periods referred to days, while six others referred
to months. In the time estimation task as well as in the
choice task, the order of the items was randomized and
different for each participant.
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FIGURE 3
PREFERENCE FOR EARLIER DELIVERY AS A FUNCTION
OF THE TEMPORAL FRAME AND SALIENCE OF THE
ALTERNATIVE TEMPORAL FRAME: STUDY 4
Results
As each participant made 12 binary choices, a multilevel
logistic regression model was estimated. We estimated sev-
eral models that all included product (CD vs. cell phone;
dummy variable), initial delivery date (in 3 vs. in 12 months;
dummy variable), price increase for expedited delivery (5%
vs. 10% vs. 15%; two dummy variables), and experimental
condition (three dummy variables). We tested various mod-
els; the best model—both empirically and theoretically—
included all the predictors specified above.
We first discuss the parameter estimates that are of little
theoretical importance but which show that our respondents
were affected by the relevant information for each situation:
the respondents were more likely to opt for the earlier, more
expensive delivery, as earlier delivery became less expen-
sive (x2(2) p 60.60, p ! .001), when the original delivery
date was 3 rather than 12 months from now (x2(1) p 21.85,
p ! .001), and for the CD than for the cell phone (x2(1) p
26.09, p ! .001).
We now turn to the most relevant factor, the experimental
condition. The results indicate that the preference for earlier
delivery varied across the four experimental conditions (x2(3)
p 8.56, p p .036). When the subjective time estimation
task did not render an alternative temporal frame salient,
the unit effect was obtained: a higher preference for earlier
delivery when this meant obtaining the product 31 days
earlier compared to obtaining it 1 month earlier (x2(1) p
4.54, p p .033). In contrast, when the subjective time es-
timation task made an alternative temporal frame salient,
the unit effect was eliminated (x2(1) p 0.01, p p .99).
To grasp this pattern more easily, figure 3 shows the ob-
served choice probability averaged across the 12 different
situations for each condition. It shows that the probability
of opting for earlier delivery is lowest (35%) when the in-
formation was specified in months and participants are not
made aware that this could have been specified in days.
When the information was specified in days and participants
are not made aware that this could have been specified in
months, the probability of opting for earlier delivery was
much higher (47%). When the alternative time scale was
made salient in the subjective estimation task, the probability
of opting for earlier delivery did not depend on whether the
time information was specified in months (48%) or days
(47%). The three latter probabilities did not differ signifi-
cantly (all p 1 .75), but they all differed from the former
one (all p ! .04).
Discussion
The results corroborate our reasoning that consumers do
not routinely think of the alternative scales on which the
same quantitative information could be provided. As a result,
changing the unit in which information is offered affects
perceived attribute differences and thus leads to different
preferences and choices. When people have to decide on
paying more for expedited delivery, they are more likely to
do so when the product is delivered 31 days earlier than
when it is delivered 1 month earlier, despite the equivalence
of these two time periods. This replicates the unit effect
observed in the previous studies. However, when the pos-
sible translation of one temporal frame to another is first
made salient, the unit effect is eliminated (hypothesis 5).
The fact that the probability of opting for earlier but more
expensive delivery is lower when consumers can gain 1
month rather than 31 days reflects the fact that 31 days is
seen as a bigger gain than 1 month is. What is somewhat
intriguing, though, is that in the two conditions in which
participants are made aware of alternative time frames, a
higher preference for the expedited delivery is observed
when compared to the original 1-month condition. More-
over, the preference in those two conditions is identical to
the preference in the original 31-days condition. At first
sight, one may expect the probabilities in the two conditions
in which the alternative temporal frames are made salient
to lie in between the other two conditions. However, as these
participants now start paying attention to the time unit, their
perception of the time gain may no longer differ between
“1 month” and “31 days.” As it happens, the time gain they
associate with earlier delivery appears to be similar in the
two conditions in which the alternative temporal frames are
made salient and in the original 31-days condition. This
suggests that the time gain is particularly underestimated
when consumers are told that they could gain 1 month but
do not realize that this is equivalent to 31 days.
STUDY 5: THE UNIT EFFECT AND
RELATIVE THINKING
Studies 1–4 indicate that the scale used for attribute infor-
mation may affect consumer evaluations and decisions.
However, in those studies the changes in units in which the
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information was expressed did not change the ratios or pro-
portional differences. Still, studies of number representation
in both animals and humans reveal that the mental magni-
tude associated with a given number is a logarithmic func-
tion of the objective number (Dehaene 1997, 2003; Dehaene,
Dehaene-Lambertz, and Cohen 1998; Nieder and Miller
2003). Therefore, the same objective difference becomes
subjectively smaller when it refers to higher numbers, so
the difference between 100 and 101 seems smaller than the
difference between 1 and 2. As a result, consumers seem
particularly sensitive to proportional attribute differences
and attribute ratios (e.g., Hsee et al. 2009; Kwong and Wong
2006). To reconcile the observed unit effect with consumers’
sensitivity to ratios or proportional differences, we consider
whether the scale that expresses an attribute may increase
or decrease the impact of such ratios and proportional dif-
ferences. In particular, we test the following hypothesis:
H6: Consumers are more sensitive to attribute ratios
and proportional differences when the attribute is
expressed in many units.
In study 5, we ask participants to compare a set of home
cinema systems with varying quality levels to a system with
perfect quality and then indicate how much more they would
be willing to pay for the perfect system than for each other
system in the set. We again manipulate the scale used to
provide the quality information (10 vs. 1,000 units). We also
propose the following relation between WTP and the quality
of the systems:
Q 2 Qp cWTP p a ,( )Q p
where Qp refers to the perfect quality level, and Qc is to the
quality level of the current system. The equation above thus
describes a linear relationship between WTP and the pro-
portional difference between the qualities of the systems.
The slope a should relate positively to the number of units
used to provide quality information: that is, willingness to
pay extra for the perfect system should increase more steeply
when the quality information appears on the 1,000-unit scale
than when it is expressed on the 10-unit scale.
Method
Seventy-one students (28 men, 43 women) with various
majors at Ghent University participated for partial course
credit (mean age p 22.34 years; SD p 4.12). Participants
received quality information about 12 focal home cinema
systems, although half considered this information on a
1,000-point scale, and the other half saw a score on a 10-
point scale. Participants imagined winning one of the sys-
tems but also could upgrade to a perfect system in exchange
for money. Each participant therefore indicated, for the 12
systems, how much more they would be willing to pay (in
euros) for the perfect home cinema system. The quality of
the 12 systems ranged from 4 (400) to 9.5 (950), in steps
of 0.5 (50).
Results
To test for outliers, we first regressed each participant’s
WTP estimates on the quality of the focal system. For two
participants, the slope was more than 3 SD above the mean
slope; for one participant, the intercept was more than 3 SD
above the mean intercept. We discarded data from these three
participants.
We next regressed WTP (in euros) on the number of units
(10 vs. 1,000) and the quality of the focal system for the
remaining participants. To test whether the slope differs
across unit conditions, we include the interaction between
the number of units and focal quality. A multilevel linear
regression model accounts for the repeated-measures nature
of the data. The analysis reveals a main effect of focal quality
(F(1, 66) p 102.66, p ! .001), which is qualified by a
significant interaction with the number of units (F(1, 66) p
15.06, p ! .001). Therefore, the slope is higher in the 1,000-
unit condition (a p 343.42) than in the 10-unit condition
(a p 153.22).
The regression model depends on the assumption of lin-
earity, so we undertake an alternative analysis in which we
subject the WTP data to a 2 (number of units: 10 vs. 1,000)
# 12 (proportional difference: 5%–60%) ANOVA with re-
peated measures on the second factor. This ANOVA yields
significant main effects of both proportional difference
(F(11, 66) p 11.83, p ! .001) and number of units (F(1,
66) p 6.56, p p .013). As we hypothesized, we also find
a significant interaction between proportional difference and
number of units (F(11, 66) p 11.83, p ! .001). When the
focal quality is very good (9.5/10 or 950/1,000) and the
proportional difference is 5%, no significant difference in
WTP appears between the two scale conditions (M10 p
19.61 vs. M1,000 p 27.29; t(66) p 1.06, p p .29). When
the focal quality is rather bad, though (4/10 or 400/1,000),
with a proportional difference of 60%, the WTP for the
perfect system increases significantly in the 1,000-unit con-
dition compared with the 10-unit condition (M10 p 155.00
vs. M1,000 p 281.71; t(66) p 2.96, p ! .01).
Finally, follow-up interaction trend tests confirm that the
linear relationship differs in the 1,000-unit compared with
the 10-unit condition (F(1, 66) p 9.72, p ! .001). Of the
interaction trend tests, only the cubic test is also significant
(F(1, 66) p 5.48, p p .02). We display, in figure 4, the
mean WTP for each proportional difference, along with a
fitted polynomial. In the 10-unit condition, the data can be
described adequately by a linear function, whereas in the
1,000-unit condition, the relation between proportional dif-
ference and WTP slightly departs from linearity at both ends
of the displayed curve. The resulting sigmoid curve requires
both a linear and a cubic trend to describe it.
Discussion
To reconcile our results with consumers’ sensitivity to
proportional differences, we posit that the influence of pro-
portional differences depends on the number of units used
to express an attribute, such that the proportional difference
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FIGURE 4
MEAN WILLINGNESS TO PAY (WTP) FOR PERFECT QUAL-
ITY AS A FUNCTION OF CURRENT QUALITY AND SCALE:
STUDY 5
sensitivity may increase with the number of scale units (hy-
pothesis 6). Study 5 supports this line of reasoning. The
slope that relates the proportional quality difference to WTP
becomes steeper when the quality appears in terms of 1,000
units than when it is expressed in terms of 10 units. There-
fore, the difference in WTP between the 10- and 1,000-unit
conditions should be more pronounced for greater objective
quality differences than for smaller objective quality dif-
ferences. Participants indicate they would pay significantly
more in the 1,000-unit condition than in the 10-unit con-
dition for a perfect system when the focal system offers
poor quality, although not when the focal system is nearly
perfect.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
When consumers receive quantitative information, they are
sometimes unfamiliar with the unit in which it is expressed.
For instance, consumers may receive price and budget in-
formation in a foreign currency or temperature and distance
information in a metric system they are not accustomed to.
In such circumstances, they probably try to make sense of
the given information by estimating or calculating the cor-
responding value in a familiar unit. In other cases, however,
the unit may seem much more arbitrary, and consumers may
readily accept the unit in which quantitative information is
expressed rather than try to translate it to another unit. How-
ever, quantitative information can often be expressed in dif-
ferent units. Changes in the unit in which information is
specified may lead to preference reversals (Burson et al.
2009).
This article extends prior research on the unit effect in
several respects. First, we document that the process un-
derlying preference reversals is due to changes in the unit
of quantitative information: when the same attribute differ-
ence appears in the form of more units, consumers perceive
it as larger (study 1 and 2). Such changes in perceptions
lead to an increased preference for the option that is superior
on the focal attribute (study 2). Second, to the best of our
knowledge, this article is the first to show a unit effect in
real consumer choices (study 3). Third, we show that the
unit effect occurs because consumers fail to take into account
that the same information could have been specified in an
alternative unit—reminding them of this fact eliminates the
unit effect (study 4). Fourth, we show that the unit in which
attribute information is provided affects consumers’ sensi-
tivity to proportional differences and ratios of attribute levels
(study 5).
One may wonder to what extent the unit effect may be
simply due to the logarithmic relation between numbers and
their mental representation. However, while this relation im-
plies that the same unit difference appears smaller when the
numbers involved are higher (i.e., the 2-unit difference be-
tween 109 and 107 appears smaller than the 2-unit difference
between 9 and 7), it does not imply that a certain difference
also appears smaller when it is expressed on an expanded
scale. In fact, a logarithmic mental number account would
make the opposite prediction. While the objective propor-
tional difference between a 7-year warranty and a 9-year
warranty is the same as that between an 84-month warranty
and a 108-month warranty: (9 2 7)/9 p (108 2 84)/108 p
.22, the subjective proportional difference is bigger in the
former situation: (log(9) 2 log(7))/log(9) p .11 1 (log(108)
2 log(84))/log(108) p .05. This indicates that the observed
unit effect cannot simply be reduced to the logarithmic re-
lation between numbers and their mental representation.
We believe that the unit effect occurs when consumers
fail to take into account the unit in which quantitative in-
formation is expressed. As a result, they treat the numbers
they receive as dimensionless quantities. In this situation,
bigger numbers represent larger quantities than smaller num-
bers. Correspondingly, when attribute differences are ex-
pressed as many units, they are thought to be larger than
when they are expressed as fewer units. In a sense, the unit
effect occurs because people focus on the number of units
rather than the type of units.
Several other phenomena result from a similar failure to
adequately account for the type of unit involved. For in-
stance, people incorrectly believe cancer is riskier when
statistics report that it affects 1,286 of every 10,000 persons
than when they report that it causes the death of 24.14 per
100 persons (Yamagishi 1997; see also Raghubir 2008).
People also prefer to draw from an urn with 10 winning
and 90 nonwinning possibilities than from one with 1 win-
ning and 9 nonwinning possibilities (Kirkpatrick and Epstein
1992; see also Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994). Such a ratio
bias appears to relate to experiential processing, in that peo-
ple can simulate drawing a winning possibility (or contract-
ing a disease) more easily when the number of possibilities
increases. However, because in our studies the numbers refer
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to things other than probabilities, differences in ease of sim-
ulation cannot explain the unit effect. In addition, the ratio
bias appears to emerge for small probabilities only (Denes-
Raj and Epstein 1994), but the unit effect is stronger when
the objective difference is high (study 5).
Previous studies have also demonstrated several currency
numerosity effects: the value of foreign prices and budgets
is overestimated when the foreign denomination is larger
than the domestic one and underestimated when lower. This
(reverse) face-value effect seems to be driven by anchoring:
people’s estimated quantities, prices, or budgets gravitate
toward a number (the anchor) that became accessible im-
mediately before the judgment (Blankenship et al. 2008;
Tversky and Kahneman 1974). One may wonder to what
extent the documented unit effect similarly results from an-
choring.
Anchoring occurs when people’s numeric judgments
(e.g., estimate how long the Mississippi is) are affected by
a number or magnitude that is activated before they render
their judgment. The literature on anchoring distinguishes
between two mechanisms (Blankenship et al. 2008; Wegener
et al. 2010). A first mechanism involves thoughtful, elab-
orative processing. This mechanism operates when people
are first asked to consider a certain number as an estimate
—the anchor—and, subsequently, to give their own esti-
mate. People’s own estimates are affected by the anchor
because it increases the accessibility of information consis-
tent with the anchor (Strack and Mussweiler 1997). We did
not ask our participants to contemplate any number as a
potential response, so the unit effect cannot be explained by
high-elaboration anchoring.
A second mechanism involves nonthoughtful processes.
This mechanism operates when people are asked to write
down an arbitrary number (Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec
2003) or to draw long versus short lines (Oppenheimer et
al. 2008). Although the anchor itself is not considered a
viable response, it may indirectly affect numeric responses
through number or magnitude priming (Critcher and Gilo-
vich 2008; Wilson et al. 1996; Wong and Kwong 2000).
Several aspects of our findings are also not congenial to an
interpretation in terms of low-elaboration anchoring. First,
we observe the unit effect also when participants did not
give numerical responses but simply made choices (study
2A, 3, and 4). Second, it is unclear how anchoring would
explain that the unit effect is eliminated when participants
are reminded of the existence of an alternative unit, con-
sidering that the information they received was not changed
(study 4). Finally, in study 2B, no unit effect occurs for
judgments of price differences. Because basic anchoring
does not require relevance (Critcher and Gilovich 2008;
Wong and Kwong 2000), the failure to obtain a unit effect
on dimensions that relate empirically to the focal dimension
also strongly argues against an interpretation based on an-
choring effects.
Although we argue that neither high-elaboration nor low-
elaboration anchoring may explain the unit effect, one might
conceptualize the unit effect as a different form of anchoring.
First, even when consumers are not asked how big the dif-
ference is between two attribute levels, to make any choice,
they need to evaluate the difference. As such, they generate
an internal magnitude appraisal. Second, one could view the
numeric difference as an anchor that affects the internal
magnitude appraisal: differences on expanded scales lead to
higher internal magnitude appraisals than differences on
contracted scales. Third, while high- and low-elaboration
anchoring involve insufficient adjustment from an anchor,
the unit effect occurs because consumers do not adjust at
all, as they do not realize that the information could have
been specified in an alternative unit. Still, this view of an-
choring implies that any situation in which people need to
make a decision based on numeric information specified in
an arbitrary unit gives rise to anchoring. So, while it is
conceptually possible to extend anchoring to include the unit
effect, in our view, this renders the concept of anchoring
overly broad, as it implies that numerical processing would
typically entail anchoring.
In our studies, we manipulated the number of scale units
in which quantitative information was expressed. On ex-
panded scales, the difference between two options consists
of more units, which results in inflated perceptions of at-
tribute differences. In some situations, however, one could
expand the scale but at the same time keep the number of
intervening steps constant. For example, Bagchi and Li
(2011) investigated how the number of points needed for a
reward in a loyalty program (e.g., 1,000 vs. 100) and the
number of points acquired by a standard transaction (e.g.,
10 per dollar vs. 1 per dollar) affect store loyalty and per-
ceived progress toward the reward. In their studies, they
jointly manipulated the points needed and the points ac-
quired by a transaction (i.e., both were multiplied by a factor
of 10). As such, they did not manipulate the number of steps
that separate different outcomes but rather the size of the
steps involved.
Bagchi and Li found that store loyalty was more affected
by the number of points already acquired when 1,000 points
were needed than when 100 points were needed. However,
this result was only obtained when the step size was am-
biguous. While the step size is ambiguous when the number
of points for a similar transaction may vary (e.g., the points
acquired through buying $10 of groceries depends on the
specific groceries involved), it is not ambiguous when the
number of points is identical for similar transactions (e.g.,
the points acquired is a linear function of money spent). In
our studies, each scale point could be viewed as a step, and
there is no ambiguity involved in the step size. We never-
theless consistently found evidence for the proposed unit
effect. It seems, then, that step-size ambiguity may only
moderate the effect of the number of scale points in situa-
tions in which the steps appear bigger rather than more
numerous.
Further Research and Implications
Numerosity effects result from an inability to properly
evaluate a given situation. For instance, slicing up a pizza
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into several pieces affects the estimated food quantity when
the pieces are removed from the plate and displayed hori-
zontally but not when they are left on the plate so that they
still form the pizza (Pelham et al., study 1). Similarly, the
(reverse) face-value effect seems limited to situations in
which consumers are unfamiliar with the unit of measure
(Jonas et al. 2002; Raghubir and Srivastava 2002). To the
extent that a consumer becomes familiar with a foreign cur-
rency, this difference disappears (Marques and Dehaene
2004). For example, shortly after the introduction of the
euro, consumers’ price perceptions exhibited a face-value
effect, but it dissipated rather rapidly (Mussweiler and En-
glich 2003; Wakker, Ko¨bberling, and Schwieren 2007). One
may wonder to what extent familiarity may also eliminate
the unit effect.
Familiarity with an attribute may entail learning the dis-
tribution of the attribute levels. Such knowledge may affect
the perception of differences between attribute levels (cf.
range frequency effect; Parducci 1965) more than the num-
ber of scale units that the differences consist of. Still, the
knowledge of the distribution of attribute levels is very spe-
cific. Hence, even though knowledge about the distribution
of quality ratings on a 100-point scale for one product may
eliminate the unit effect for that product category, a unit
effect may still be obtained for 100-point quality ratings for
a different category. In addition, familiarity may also in-
crease the likelihood that consumers are aware of an alter-
native unit in which the information can be specified. This
seems sufficient to eliminate the unit effect. It is, however,
not entirely clear why this happens. Two mechanisms are
viable. Awareness of the existence of an alternative unit
may prompt consumers to translate the information of one
unit into another. An alternative is that reminders of an
alternative unit make consumers more likely to try to elim-
inate the unit altogether. More specifically, it may prompt
them to engage in relative thinking and ignore the absolute
differences. Of course, more research is needed to test these
speculations.
While consumers may differ in how familiar they are with
certain attribute information, they also may differ in their
ability to process quantitative information. In particular,
some consumers appear to be more “numerate” than others.
Some studies indicate that numerate people are less likely
to exhibit framing effects (Peters et al. 2006). Framing ef-
fects occur when people react differently to objectively the
same information, simply because it is described differently.
Considering that the unit effect could be regarded a framing
effect, future research may investigate whether numerate
consumers are less likely to exhibit a unit effect than their
less numerate counterparts. This may be the case if numerate
consumers are more likely to be aware of alternative units
or more readily focus on relative differences than absolute
differences when comparing attribute levels. If so, differ-
ences in numeracy may underlie the interaction between
energy label and prior interest in energy information that
we obtained in study 3.
While we found evidence that an attribute difference is
considered bigger when it is expressed as many units, several
findings suggest that fewer units sometimes may evoke a
greater value. For instance, people appear to value a certain
amount of money more when it is specified as a small num-
ber of large bills rather than as a large number of small bills
(i.e., denomination effect; Raghubir and Srivastava 2009).
Furthermore, people tend to defect in a prisoner’s dilemma
game when they can gain US$2 rather than the equivalent
amount of US¢200 (Furlong and Opfer 2009). In both cases,
however, the units involved differ in associated meaning.
Large bills appear to be more strongly associated to financial
restraint than smaller ones (Raghubir and Srivastava 2009).
In a similar vein, dollars are more potent money primes than
cents (Vohs, Mead, and Goode 2006). In our situations, the
unit in which the attributes were specified probably did not
differ in evoked meaning: a 1,000-point scale is not intrin-
sically more valuable than a 10-point scale, nor does a year
connote a more positive meaning than a month. Possibly,
the occurrence of a unit effect may be limited to situations
in which the different types of units do not entail differences
in associated meaning.
Changing the unit in which information is expressed may
not only affect perceptions of the attribute differences but
also lead to various other consequences. For instance, when
consumers are confronted with attribute information that is
expressed on an expanded scale, not only may their per-
ceptions of differences be inflated, but they may also think
that more options exist with intermediate attribute values.
Further, consumers may give more weight to attributes ex-
pressed on expanded scales (for a similar speculation, see
Burson et al. 2009). In fact, two mechanisms may contribute
to an increased weight. First, expanding the scale increases
the number of levels and may also increase the perceived
range of variation; both factors increase the weight attached
to the attribute (Verlegh, Schifferstein, and Wittink 2002).
Second, in any information exchange people rely on the
Gricean maxims to make sense of the given information
(Schwarz 1994). In particular, when confronted with a scale
containing many units, consumers may infer that the attri-
bute involved must be very important. This conversational
logic also implies that expanded scales could be viewed as
very precise, and, consequently, consumers may consider
the information as more objective and accurate than they
would if it had been specified on contracted scales; detailed
information may, therefore, also engender more trust. More
research is needed to fully understand how expanded versus
contracted scales affect consumer decisions.
People’s focus on the number of units, not the type, may
be a general tendency that affects sensitivity to certain in-
formation. Study 4 already demonstrated that changing the
unit in which a time window is expressed may affect how
long it appears and, hence, how valuable the time period is.
Correspondingly, in time-discounting studies, participants
could grow less impatient if the wait time appears in weeks
rather than days, which in turn could minimize the dis-
counting rate. Time also seems to pass more quickly on a
clock that displays tenths of seconds than one that updates
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only every minute (see also Read et al. 2005). Finally, the
rate at which sensitivity to losses and gains diminishes (cf.
prospect theory; Kahneman and Tversky 1979) may depend
on the scale for expressing the attribute. That is, people may
be more sensitive to both losses and gains when they appear
on a scale that consists of many units. Further research
should investigate this speculation.
The studies in this article were always comparative as we
focused on attribute differences. However, in some situa-
tions, comparing the attribute score for one option to that
of one or more other options may not be possible. Additional
research may investigate whether a unit effect may be ob-
served in those circumstances. Such research may benefit
from distinguishing between open and closed scales. Closed
scales provide definite endpoints, whereas open scales do
not. In both cases, bigger may seem better, but people’s
appreciation for a particular level may differ according to
the state of the scale. For example, a 108-month warranty
sounds better than an 84-month warranty, but it also may
be appealing on its own. In contrast, although the quality
difference between 700 and 800 on a 1,000-unit scale ap-
pears rather big, 800 still might not represent a particularly
good score. In fact, the appreciation of a particular score
may depend on the end point with which it is compared. If
consumers compare 800 to the low end of the scale (0), it
seems far better than if they compare it against the high end
of the scale (1,000). More research is needed to assess
whether the unit of information affects consumer decisions
and whether this is moderated by type of scale (open vs.
closed).
We also suggest several managerial implications based on
the unit effect. Brands could increase perceptions of their
superiority by expressing their scores on a superior attribute
in the form of many units (see also Burson et al. 2009),
which may be particularly effective in comparative adver-
tising. Loyalty programs that offer points based on the
amount consumers spend also should reflect our findings.
The difference between rewards A and B may seem greater
if consumers must accumulate 500 points for A and 700
points for B, rather than 5 and 7 points. Thus, compared
with the alarm clock for 500 points, an MP3 player for 700
points likely will seem more valuable. Consumers can be-
come very focused on their loyalty points (cf. medium max-
imization; Hsee et al. 2003), and a scale with more units
could stimulate them to spend more than would a reward
system with fewer points. Also, when consumers have the
choice between a hedonic and a functional reward, greater
perceived effort makes them lean toward the hedonic reward
(Kivetz and Simonson 2003). As the number of points as-
sociated with the reward increases—when there are more
units—consumers may perceive their effort as greater, which
could drive them toward more hedonic rewards.
Conclusion
Various studies have demonstrated phenomena that are
perceived as numerosity effects. It appears that, to qualify
as a numerosity effect, a given phenomenon should be con-
sistent with the general idea that consumers associate bigger
numbers with bigger quantities. However, the processes in-
volved differ across specific phenomena. For instance, ease
of simulation is involved in the ratio-bias phenomenon, and
anchoring underlies the (reverse) face-value effect. In our
view, there is a marked difference between basic numerosity
effects, which solely are driven by the neglect of the specific
unit in which quantitative information is expressed, and nu-
merosity effects that involve other processes. In the latter
phenomena, the neglect of the type of unit is more apparent
than real. In currency numerosity phenomena, consumers
are definitely aware of alternative currencies. In ratio-bias
studies, many participants are aware of the units involved
but act against rational judgment because it feels better to
do so (Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994). Different types of nu-
merosity effects may not only involve different mechanisms
but, accordingly, entail different moderators as well.
This article demonstrates a unit effect: the number of units
in which an attribute difference is expressed affects con-
sumers’ perceptions. In particular, differences become more
pronounced on scales with many units. So, although a 9-
year warranty is 29% longer than a 7-year warranty, just
like a 108-month warranty is compared with an 84-month
warranty, the latter 29% difference appears longer. This
change in perception may lead to altered preferences but is
eliminated when the alternative units in which attribute in-
formation could have been specified are made salient. Cor-
respondingly, we consider the unit effect a basic numerosity
effect. As such, we believe that it is relevant for any setting
that contains quantitative information specified on a scale
that consumers and decision makers consider arbitrary. In
those situations, they simply fail to consider that alternative
specifications may exist, and the unit effect ensues. The
demonstration of unit effects in various different situations
involving distinctly different attributes (see also Bagchi and
Li 2011; Burson et al. 2009) testifies to this presumed gen-
erality. Although the unit effect may be obtained in a host
of situations, we also pointed out some potential boundary
conditions; these provide an avenue for future research.
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